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Article
Great Judicial Opinions versus Great Literature: Should
the Two be Measured by the Same Criteria?
Annie M. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
I read something that moved me a lot not very long ago. I was
reading something by Chesterton, and he was talking about one of the
Bront~s, I think her Jane Eyre. He says you go and look out at the city-I
think he was looking at London-and he said you know, you see all
those houses now, even at the end of the nineteenth century and they
look all as if they're the same. And you think all those people are out
there going to work and they're all the same. He says, but what Bronte
tells you is they're not the same. Each one of those persons in each one
of those houses and each one of those families is different, and they each
have a story to tell. Each of those stories involves something about
human passion. Each of those stories involves a man, a woman, children,
families, work, lives-and you get that sense out of the book. And so
sometimes I've found literature very helpful as a way out of the tower.'
When asked for a list of the ten most important books in his personal library
during his Senate Confirmation hearings, Associate Justice Stephen Breyer's
response illustrated a lucid tension for judges concerned with striking a realistic
balance for litigants bringing claims before them: emotionalism versus rationalism.
Emotionalism, in this context, refers to a consideration of how one's actions will
affect individuals in reality, rather than simply on paper. Instead of merely
constructing a legal rule that appears to decide the circumstances accurately, a judge
who employs this version of emotionalism will attempt to envision a legal rule's
potential effect before deciding whether it offers the best solution. Doing so requires
the judge to engage in a form of judicial empathy-to reach down and attempt to
know the litigants' experiences from the inside out.' The term "empathy" in this
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, May 2005; B.A., Inter-cultural
Communications and Government, California State University, Sacramento, 2001. Special thanks to Steve
Amaral, Nirav Desai, Professor Thomas Main, and Professor Greg Pingree for their patience, flexibility,
encouragement, and honest feedback.
1. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 232-33 (1994), reprinted in MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 79 (1995).
2. See Richard A. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 309, 323
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (acknowledging that empathy is an important emotion for judges to partake in and
stating "[t]he importance of judicial empathy is to bring home to the judge the interests of the absent parties").
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context is admittedly something of a misnomer, because empathy in its purest sense
refers to the vicarious understanding of another person's thoughts or feelings!
Because a vicarious understanding of all litigants' legal woes is an impractical
expectation to have of judges, "judicial empathy" is better understood as a judge's
attempt to make empathy as likely as possible.
This may be (and probably is) an impossible task, but judges who accept this
endeavor necessarily gain an understanding of the individual parties, both present
and absent, and consequently demonstrate a concern for the parties' needs and
motivations. Emotionalism need not be misunderstood as giving way to sterile
reason.4 The term "judicial temperament" refers to a well-balanced combination
of the two modes of decision-making, and is recognized as an admirable trait in
judges, as evidenced by Justice Breyer's quote above.5
Comparatively, rationalism refers to logical, linear arguments that can be
made either for or against a particular perspective. The assembly of facts,
reasoning, and conclusions, all with distinct and mathematical placement in an
opinion, are arranged to leave the reader with no alternative but to agree with the
judge's decision.6 Predictably, this line of reasoning focuses primarily on
technical merit.7 Recognizing that emotionalism is necessary in compelling
literature, Justice Breyer's quote suggests that both emotionalism and rationalism
are necessary components to judging-to have only the latter is to have an
incomplete toolbox, and may lead to an unjust result. The context of Justice
Breyer's response also suggests that such emotionalism can be learned and
remembered through literature, and that literature is consequently useful to a
judge wishing to hand down a thoughtful opinion.'
3. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 378 (10th ed. 1999).
4. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that "both empathetic participation and external assessment
are crucial in determining the degree of compassion it is rational to have").
5. Posner, supra note 2, at 324
The name that the legal system gives to this 'detachment empathy' is 'judicial temperament'....
The judge who gets so emotionally involved in the immediacies of the case that he is blinded to
the interests of the absent parties is said to lack judicial temperament. . . . We don't have an
official name for the judge who displays the opposite form of emotionalism-a weird pride in
maintaining a complete, inhuman indifference to the parties before him. But such judges are not
admired.
Id.
6. See Benjamin Kaplan, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REv. 528, 533 (1981) (reviewing FRANK M.
COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH (1980)) and (discussing
the various ways in which the judiciary are held accountable in a federal system and putting emphasis on the
role written opinions play and the "existence of well-recognized rules").
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. The theory that a judicial opinion need consist of anything more than a well-thought-out legal
rationale is an essay unto itself, and is indeed fuel for many analyses within the scope of law and literature. See,
e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 478 (1989) (discussing the history of the competition between philosophy and
rhetoric).
(Tihe quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric [] survives every sea change in the history of
Western thought, continually presenting us with the skewed choice between the plain
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Richard Posner9 indirectly turns to this line of judicial temperament when
stating that survival is "the operational test for greatness in literature."' Posner
borrows this test from George Orwell, who felt that contemporary views
involving taste and general preferences rendered a consensus on greatness
impossible, and thus determined a Darwinian approach more appropriate:
"[L]iterature can be judged great only by... its ability to survive in the
competition of the literary 'marketplace.""' It seems overly simple, however, to
reduce a critique of great literature to so simple a test. For example, how does
one define survival when applying Posner and Orwell's operational test? Does it
mean simply to have a second, third, or fourth edition printed of a book? Does it
imply an economic survival, where selling enough copies buys a permanent spot
on the local bookstore's "Literary Classics" shelf? How much time must pass
before the label "survived" is appropriate? If a literary work maintains
prominence throughout a generation's lifetime, but is then denounced by later
generations, has it failed the operational test? Furthermore, do novels that survive
warrant any discussion for their literary merit, as opposed to simply a calculation
of how old they are? Or is surviving the test of time evidence of a text's literary
merit?
Posner offers the following guidance for measuring survivability: "[T]he
debate [of literary merit] achieves closure only with regard to very old works...
No one is apt to question the greatness of Homer, or Dante, or Shakespeare."' 2
How much time is not enough to warrant greatness? "It is only ... more than
sixty years after major writings by Kafka, T.S. Elliot, Joyce, and Mann that we
unvarnished truth straightforwardly presented and the powerful but insidious appeal of 'fine
language,' language that has transgressed the limits of representation and substituted its own
forms for the forms of reality.
Id.
9. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Chief Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1993-2000); and Senior Lecturer in Law at University of Chicago Law School.
10. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 74 (1988). At the time
that Posner published Law and Literature he was a newcomer to the developing movement, and his book
received lukewarm reviews. See, e.g., Judith Schenck Koffler, Forged Alliance: Law and Literature, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1374, 1381-82, 1384 (1989) (book review) (stating that "[Posner's] book is, first of all, a
delightful vademecum, a go-with-me or 'companion' for anyone studying law and literature," but "a good
portion of Posner's book admittedly is a rescue effort to redeem 'valid' law and literature studies from the
apparently wrong-headed, politicized, tendentious writings of the 'law and lit' subversives," and "Posner's
attempt to introduce the reader to the murky strands of literary criticism.., will not satisfy a demanding
reader") and David Ray Papke, Problems with an Uninvited Guest: Richard A. Posner and the Law and
Literature Movement, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1067, 1074, 1077, 1079 (1989) (book review) (stating that "Posner's
attack [on law and literature scholars] borders on the ad hominem[,]" "Posner's work is, in effect, highly
combative tertiary scholarship," "[Posner's] determination to differentiate law and literature... prevent[s] him
from winning over the party into which he has boldly charged[,]" and "Law and Literature quite simply does
not measure up to the author's usual high standard of prose").
11. POSNER, supra note 10, at 71 (quoting George Orwell, Lear, Tolstoy, and the Fool, in 4 COLLECTED
ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL, 287, 290 (Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus eds., 1968)).
12. Id. at 72.
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can say with some confidence, though more provisionally than in the case of
Homer, Dante, Milton, and Shakespeare, that these men have written classics,
too."' 3 Thus, in Posner's view, if literature is one thousand years old and still
being read (Homer), it has survived unequivocally, while a work as recent as
sixty years (Kafka, Elliot, Joyce, and Mann, at the time Posner penned his test)
can probably be characterized as having survived, though not comfortably so.
To answer the question of what enables and encourages literature to survive,
it is first necessary to define what literature is. Posner says that "[w]ritings count
as literature when ... they have something (no one is quite sure what) that
enables them to become or to be made meaningful to an audience different from
the one for which they are written."'5 In order for literature to manifest perpetual
meaning, Posner supposes that it "must deal with things that do not change over
time-must deal with the perennial concerns of human-kind and hence with the
general and permanent features of the human condition.' ' 16 This description
mirrors Justice Breyer's analysis of the usefulness of literature in judging:
literature, per Posner, survives when it universally appeals to people at a
fundamental level. It survives because generation upon generation will face the
same issues, and will thus read the same novel and (perhaps) gain similar
understanding. Judges, in turn, will hear two parties present a case and will
render a rule that, in the short term, has immediacy for these parties, but in the
long term, could affect innumerable persons. It is a judge's duty to take the
specific facts and foresee the consequences of universal application. There is
universality in both: literature sustains itself by perpetually exploring human
issues common to all generations, and judicial opinions are universal in the need
for understanding a rule's potential effect on future litigants.
Given the common overarching theme of universal applicability to individual
issues, one is tempted to apply the same test used for great literature to discerning
great judicial opinions. However, determining which judicial opinions are
unquestionably great in a country not even 250 years old is a somewhat futile
undertaking if confined to Posner and Orwell's test of survivability. Is the test of
time a meaningful way to identify great judicial opinions? Initially, it seems
improper to suggest that the test directly applies to judicial opinions in the same
way that Posner asserts it does to literature. Posner, in fact, does not suggest that
survivability should act as the operational test for great judicial opinions, but is
instead one of several factors in judging great judicial opinions.'7
13. Id. at 73.
14. Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation was published in 1988.
15. Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1421, 1424
(1995). Posner's definition is not genre specific, and thus may give literary critics pause. For purposes of this
comment, the term "literature" refers only to fictional novels. For a more in depth discussion on the question of
what is literature, see generally TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY (1983).
16. POSNER, supra note 10, at 74.
17. Id. at 287. Posner concedes that there is an element of arbitrariness in evaluating judicial opinions
based on taste, just as there is in critiquing great literature. "Resolving disagreement in difficult legal cases need
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Why is survivability not the determinative factor for great judicial opinions,
as it is for great literature, if both turn on how well individual issues are handled
in light of universal applicability? Are judicial opinions not analogous to
literature in that certain characteristics of each enable the texts to sustain an
active readership, thus surviving, while other pieces of the same type of writing
do not? The technical characteristics of each genre that foster survival may be
different, but isn't the final question the same-whether each type of work has
ultimately survived?
Justice Breyer's quote suggests an answer: thoughtful judicial opinions
require both emotionalism and rationalism. Emotionalism and rationalism are
two types of rhetoric, a term Aristotle defined as "the faculty of discovering all
the possible means of persuasion in any subject."'" If rhetoric is the study of
persuasion, then how is persuasion defined? Most simply, it is successfully
achieving a chosen end.'9 Employing two forms of rhetoric creates more
definitions of the term "survived" than exist in the realm of literature, where only
one mode of rhetoric is needed: emotionalism. Because both emotionalism and
rationalism are necessary for a great judicial opinion, a different array of factors
must exist in judicial opinions that need not be present in great literature.
In attempting to compare the criteria for great judicial opinions and great
literature, and in determining whether there is any ground for suggesting that
there should be more overlap than already exists, this comment will compare and
contrast two seminal pieces of literature, To Kill a Mockingbird0 and The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,2' with two historic judicial opinions, Plessy v.
Ferguson22 and Brown v. Board of Education.2 These four texts, studied in
unison, present a unique opportunity to examine how multiple authors have
treated a single theme.24 This comparison will illustrate that the differences
no more be a pure matter of taste than the resolution of literary disputes over the merit of Kafka's fiction." Id.
However, rather than disposing of all arbitrariness with the operational test of time, he lists it as one of many
factors that aid or detract from an opinion's overall persuasiveness. Id. See also John V. Orth, John Marshall
and the Rule of Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 633 (1998) (book review) ("Longevity alone does not ensure eminence in
judging.., and a voluminous output is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of judicial greatness."). But
see RUGGERO J. ADLISERT, OPINION WRITING 10 (1990) (stating that timeliness and current public opinion are
factors for whether case law may survive, thus implying that survival is a key factor in identifying high quality
opinions).
18. PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
91 (1987) (internal quotation omitted).
19. Id. at 92 ("Rhetoric studies the linguistic means that allow a chosen end to be achieved.").
20. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Warner Books 1982) (1960).
21. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Penguin Books 2003) (1885).
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. The selected texts all turn on the common theme of race, which serves to neutralize the concern that
topic choice has bearing on a text's greatness, regardless of the genre in which it falls. Keeping Posner's
suggested timeframe in mind, To Kill a Mockingbird is admittedly still on the outskirts of achieving
"greatness." However, using examples that all center on a common theme and comparing the book's other
features will serve to demonstrate that time is not the only calibrator for greatness.
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between the two genres, particularly the different uses of rhetoric, require
different standards for evaluating greatness.
This comment is not an attempt to develop an exhaustive list of what criteria
should be used when evaluating great judicial opinions, nor is it an attempt to
question whether Posner's test of survivability is a workable measure for great
literature. The goal of this comment is to question why the same test is not useful
when classifying a judicial opinion as "great." Consequently, it is sufficient for
purposes of this comment to accept Posner's test of survivability for great
literature.25 Ultimately, this comment is meant to suggest that while much has
been contributed to the interdisciplinary study of law and literature, judicial
opinions and literature serve different purposes. These differing functions
implement diverse types of rhetoric, and consequently, warrant different criteria
when being evaluated for greatness.
II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO GENRES
A. Characteristics of Great Literature
Utilizing Posner's succinct test, it is easiest to begin comparing genres with
examples from the category that Posner's test addresses: great literature.
To Kill a Mockingbird is set in a small town in Alabama during the 1930s,
but was written during the 1950s and published in 1960, in the midst of the
pervasive racial tension that marked the Civil Rights Movement. 26 Scout is the
impudent main character, and it is she who recounts the story of how Jem, her
brother, "[w]hen he was nearly thirteen... got his arm badly broken at the
elbow. '27 Although her brother's arm being broken is the climax of the novel, the
story actually turns on their father, Atticus, a reputable attorney in town, who
defends a local black man charged with raping a white woman. On the eve of
trial, Atticus has reason to believe that his client's life is in danger, and so he
These four texts were also chosen because of their proximity in time to one another. Plessy v. Furguson
was decided in 1896, only eleven years after Huckleberry Finn was published. See TWAIN, supra note 21.
Similarly, Brown v. Board of Education was decided in 1954, only six years before To Kill a Mockingbird was
published. See LEE, supra note 20. For more explanation, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
25. Posner's test for great literature did not receive much attention in book reviews. In her book review,
Judith Schenck Koffler mentions the test only in passing, see Koffler, supra note 10, at 1384. David Ray Papke,
supra note 10, at 1080, does discuss it in contrast to what other literary critics assert. "[Many literary critics
have] convincingly argued that great literature is labeled as such by elites in various epochs for assorted
ideological reasons. [Citation omitted.] Posner, by contrast, proposes a survival theory of literature. Literary
works face a Darwinian test, and only the strongest survive." As noted, though, this comment is not challenging
Posner's Darwinian test as applied to literature. Instead, Posner's assertion that survivability is the test for great
literature is accepted without examination for purposes of discussing whether the same test has meaning within
the genre of judicial opinions.
26. Calvin Woodard, Listening to the Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REV. 563, 567 (1994) (asserting that
Harper Lee wrote To Kill a Mockingbird during the 1950s).
27. LEE, supra note 20, at 3.
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guards the local jail. Having not been given a satisfactory explanation for their
father's outing, Scout, Jem, and their faithful companion, Dill, sneak out to
investigate.
Shortly after spying Atticus, the children witness a group of men who enter
the town square and instruct Atticus to leave the premises. Unable to contain
herself, Scout bursts into the group in hopes of neutralizing the tension. As a
confrontation develops between Jem and Atticus, Scout has the following
exchange with the father of a boy she knows from school:
"Go home, Jem," [Atticus] said. "Take Scout and Dill home."
Jem shook his head....
"Son, I said go home."
Jem shook his head.
"I'll send him home," a burly man said, and grabbed Jem roughly by
the collar....
In the midst of this strange assembly, Atticus stood trying to make
Jem mind him....
I was getting a bit tired of that... I looked around the crowd.... I
sought once more for a familiar face, and at the center of the semi-circle,
I found one.
"Hey, Mr. Cunningham."
The man did not hear me, it seemed.
"Hey Mr. Cunningham. How's your entailment gettin' along?"
Mr. Walter Cunningham's legal affairs were well known to me;
Atticus had once described them at length. The big man blinked and
hooked his thumbs in his overall straps. He seemed uncomfortable; he
cleared his throat and looked away. My friendly overture had fallen flat.
"Don't you remember me, Mr. Cunningham? I'm Jean Louise Finch.
You brought us some hickory nuts one time, remember?" I began to
sense the futility one feels when unacknowledged by a chance
acquaintance.
"I go to school with Walter," I began again. "He's your boy, ain't
he? Ain't he, sir?"
Mr. Cunningham was moved to a faint nod. He did know me, after
all.
"He's in my grade," I said, "and he does right well. He's a good
boy," I added, "a real nice boy. We brought him home for dinner one
time. Maybe he told you about me, I beat him up one time but he was
real nice about it. Tell him hey for me, won't you?"
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Atticus had said it was the polite thing to talk to people about what
they were interested in, not about what you were interested in. Mr.
Cunningham displayed no interest in his son, so I tackled his entailment
once more in a last-ditch effort to make him feel at home.
"Entailments are bad," I was advising him, when I slowly awoke to
the fact that I was addressing the entire aggregation. The men were all
looking at me, some had their mouths half-open. Atticus had stopped
poking at Jem: they were standing together beside Dill. Their attention
amounted to fascination. Atticus's mouth, even, was half-open, an
attitude he had once described as uncouth. Our eyes met and he shut it.
"Well, Atticus, I was just sayin' to Mr. Cunningham that entailments
are bad an' all that, but you said not to worry, it takes a long time
sometimes ... that you all'd ride it out together.. ." I was slowly drying
up, wondering what idiocy I had committed. Entailments seemed all right
enough for livingroom talk.
Atticus said nothing. I looked around and up at Mr. Cunningham,
whose face was equally impassive. Then he did a peculiar thing. He
squatted down and took me by both shoulders.
"I'll tell him you said hey, little lady," he said.
Then he straightened up and waved a big paw. "Let's clear out," he
called. "Let's get going, boys. 28
Unlike To Kill a Mockingbird, which followed the Brown v. Board of
Education decision by six years, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn preceded
Plessy v. Ferguson by eleven years.29 Published in 1885, Huckleberry Finn
shadowed the closure of the Reconstruction era that followed the Civil War. Set
in the years preceding the war, Huck Finn is the son of a drunkard, and the story
follows Huck's escape from his abusive father down the Mississippi River.
Although Huck is initially alone when he runs away, he soon encounters Jim, an
escaped slave whom Huck knows. The two forge an alliance, albeit a contentious
one for Huck, who struggles with the obligation he feels to turn Jim in. This
theme runs consistently throughout the novel, springing up when Huck and Jim
meet new people.
Huck comes very close to turning Jim in, and even writes a letter to the
woman who owns Jim. It is at this climactic moment that Huck must choose
between the social obligations of recognizing slavery and what his conscience
has told him since the start of this adventure: that Jim is a real person with
28. Id. at 153-54.
29. To Kill a Mockingbird was published in 1960; Brown v. Board of Education was handed down on
May 17, 1954. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn was published in 1885; Plessy v. Ferguson was handed
down on May 18, 1896.
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legitimate feelings who does not deserve to be treated as mere property. After
writing the letter that would reveal Jim's status as a runaway, Huck says:
I felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first time I had ever
felt so in my life, and I knowed I could pray now. But I didn't do it
straight off, but laid the paper down and set there thinking-thinking
how good it was all this happened so, and how near I come to being lost
and going to hell. And went on thinking. And got to thinking over our
trip down the river; and I see Jim before me, all the time, in the day, and
in the nighttime, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we a
floating along, talking, and singing, and laughing. But somehow I
couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the
other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top of his'n, stead of
calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see him how glad he was when
I come back out of the fog; and when I come to him again in the swamp,
up there where the feud was; and suchlike times; and would always call
me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and
how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him by
telling the men we had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, and
said I was the best friend old Jim ever had in the world, and the only one
he's got now; and then I happened to look around, and see that paper.
It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I was a
trembling, because I'd got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I
knowed it. I studied a minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to
myself:
"All right, then, I'll go to hell"-and tore it up.
30
The above excerpts from Huckleberry Finn and To Kill a Mockingbird
implement Posner's strategy of using a universal theme that maintains the in-
terest of a timeless audience by incorporating perpetual issues that are not easily
solved. The passages from these two novels address the notion of confronting
authority within the confines of social limitations. Atticus defies society by
attempting to provide a black man with a fair legal trial. Scout defies her father
by being present at the scene and refusing to leave. Scout also defies the group of
men that is threatening Atticus by being so bold as to ask an adult about his
personal legal affairs, and by insisting that he acknowledge her efforts at
conversation. Huck Finn faces the same societal constraints as Atticus, grappling
with the decision of whether to assist a runaway slave, whom Huck knows to be a
loyal friend and a person of integrity, in evading authorities. All of the characters
challenge societal norms in the context of a racial environment, yet the stories
were published seventy-five years apart.3
30. TWAIN, supra note 21, at 227-28 (emphasis in original).
31. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn was published in 1885; To Kill a Mockingbird was published in
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Huck Finn illustrated the problems that went unsolved by the Civil War,
namely society's persistent prejudice against blacks and slaves. Although the
novel is presumably set in a pre-Civil War context, 32 there would have been no
need to address the issues, had they been cured by the end of the war and the
Reconstruction era that followed. Seventy-five years later, To Kill a Mockingbird
addressed many of the same themes explored in Huckleberry Finn, specifically
Atticus's willingness, like Huck's, to defy society's perspective that a black
person does not deserve the dignity of being recognized as a whole person, and
thus does not receive effective or adequate protection of the laws.
Huck's decision to rebel against societal mores begins when he recalls the
memories that he and Jim have created during their adventure on the raft. Huck's
decision to abide by his own conscience, regardless of the consequences society
will inevitably impose on him, is clear when he says, "All right then, I'll go to
hell."33 Atticus's character serves the same rebellious role as Huck's when he
agrees to defend the case against Tom Robinson. The selected passage reveals
Atticus's dedication and beliefs through both a contextual mechanism and the
specific text. Contextually, Atticus is sitting alone, at night, under a single light
bulb, prepared to defend his client should this group of men attempt harm.
Atticus believes that his client is entitled to a fair trial, and he is doing everything
he can to ensure Tom Robinson receives one, even if it means defending
Robinson against a mob of drunk, angry men. This same commitment to do right
by his client, regardless of race, is demonstrated when Atticus, refusing to leave
the jail, requests that Jem escort Scout and Dill safely home. Atticus is so
committed to protecting Tom Robinson that he is not only willing to risk physical
harm to himself, but he is also willing to entrust the children's safety to Jem, who
is just twelve years old.
The choices that Huck and Atticus both face-of succumbing to society's
perspective or trusting individual instinct-suggest that society was facing a
similar dilemma during the time periods in which both were written, at the end of
a less than successful Reconstruction era and the inception of the Civil Rights
Movement. Clearly, the issues had not been fully redressed. In response, two
unconnected authors chose to address prevalent societal concerns in their novels,
1960.
32. There are actually no date references made in the novel. However, given that Jim's owner frees him
in her will at the end of the novel, it follows that the setting of the novel took place in a time period during
which slaves were still legally bought and sold.
33. TWAIN, supra note 21, at 228. Huck's references to going to hell and "finally being washed clean of
all sin" are indicative of pressure he was also feeling from a divine source. For purposes of this comment,
however, it is sufficient to limit discussion of the common themes to those emanating directly from society.
34. Of course Huck's lesson is self-serving: it is the adventure on the raft with Jim that enables him to
understand the conflict he faces. Before developing his friendship with Jim, Huck would not have had reason to
question the issue of prejudice and slavery. Atticus, on the other hand, enters the plot with a well-grounded
understanding of human dignity, and serves as a lesson for Scout who, like Huck, has not had a personal reason
to question society's views on race.
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and in so doing touched on topics that continue to be important enough that the
novels retain an active readership.
B. Great Judicial Opinions
Accepting Posner's two part assertion that (1) survivability is the operational
test for great literature, and (2) the same test does not produce good, accurate, or
meaningful results when using it as a gauge for great judicial opinions, the next
question then becomes, what defines a great judicial opinion?
1. Technical Elements
Much has been written on the subject of good versus bad judicial opinion
writing, but a non-exhaustive list of common technical themes includes: clear
articulation,5 brevity, an organized structure with key components, 7 the artful
use of legal rules (including the degree to which use of a particular rule is
rational), 3s adherence to precedent,39 and accurately applying the proper legal
35. ALDISERT, supra note 17, at 12 ("The need to state clearly the precise issues before the court is no
less important than setting forth the material facts as succinctly and carefully as possible."); WILLIAM
DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 77 (1996) (using clarity, conviction, or eloquence as one of six
criteria in choosing a canon of Supreme Court decisions); Posner, supra note 15, at 1424 (listing clarity as a
standard instruction given in handbooks on style tips for judicial opinion writers).
36. DOMNARSKI, supra note 35, at 34. Domnarski identifies Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as the first
important judicial writer of the twentieth century, who wrote his opinions standing in front of a lectern within
one or two days of receiving an assignment. Justice Holmes is quoted as saying, "nothing conduces to brevity
like a caving in of the knees."
37. ALDISERT, supra note 17, at 71 (affirming that handbooks on judicial opinion writing advocate a
five-part opinion structure); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opinions: Communicating With Candor,
Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 55 (2002) ("A well-written opinion consists of five essential parts: the
nature of the action, the statement of the facts, the questions to be decided, the determination of the issues, and
the disposition and mandate.").
38. JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND
EXPRESSION 624, 687 (1973) (stating that "the art of legal judgment is necessarily an art in the use-and
perhaps the avoidance-of rules" and that "both the judicial judgment and the opinion expressing it should be
rational"); see also Wanderer, supra note 37, at 49 (stating that "[j]udicial scholars in the United States ..
emphasize the importance of writing a reasoned justification for the outcome in a case as a way of achieving the
goals of our judicial system"); Kaplan, supra note 6, at 531 (citing the book being reviewed as providing that
"the main measures of the quality of a judicial opinion lie in its assimilation of all the facts and the fairness and
evenhandedness of its statement and handling of all the contentions that can be plausibly advanced on either
side").
39. WHITE, supra note 38, at 711 (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-14
(1921)). Cardozo emphasizes that precedent, while useful in ensuring uniformity, is only useful so long as it is
"balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare." Thus,
while sound judicial opinions may rest on decided precedent, equally sound judicial opinions may not, if done
so in light of circumstances warranting departure. See also Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style,
36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 916 (1961) (identifying that "giv[ing] a Yes or No decision that will more or less
consistently reflect the framework of the legal past.., and that at the same time will sympathetically affirm my
own and my society's current notions of justice" is the "dilemma... at the heart of the judge's function").
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rule.4° A consensus exists that these elements surface to some degree in all good
judicial opinions.
Clarity has been recognized as "the essential ingredient in achieving the
goals of [society's] judicial system,"' and yet the first thing the public associates
with lawyers is "written language impossible to understand." ' Formulaic opi-
nions are one suggested answer, with the issue presented initially and followed
by the facts, the pertinent legal rules, the application of those rules, and the
• 41
conclusion. While it goes without saying that an organized structure can
certainly add to an opinion's clarity and assist an audience to understand a
complex document, it is equally clear that structure alone cannot suffice to cure
an opinion of its ambiguity."
Brevity is of course a trait cherished by readers of judicial opinions, and
equally valued by the authors themselves. 4 But because brevity may be
impossible when dealing with complex issues of law, organized structure at these
times is even more important in producing clarity.46
Adhering to precedent commands a different level of respect, depending on
one's interpretation of the role(s) of the judiciary. An opinion that is well written
should "set[] a powerful precedent because it continues to embody the persuasive
truth that the judge's rhetoric displays.4 7 However, Justice Benjamin Cardozo
emphasized that precedent, while useful in ensuring uniformity, is only useful so
long as it is "balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness or
other elements of social welfare."4' It is at the moment "when [a judge] reforms
40. Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's Appellate Opinions, 1981-82-
Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651,
679 (2000) (quoting EDWARD D. RE, APPELLATE OPINION WRITING 1 (1975)).
41. Wanderer, supra note 37, at 48.
42. Id. at 55 (quoting George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 333, 333 (1987)).
43. Id. at 55-61 (suggesting that all well-written opinions will include the essential five parts listed, and
in that order) and John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 448 (2001)
(stating that "[olpinions do tend to follow a standard order... [which] is, of course, appropriate to the opinion's
functions").
44. DOMNARSKI, supra note 35, at 34.
One of the reasons that judicial opinions are sometimes so opaque and irrational perhaps, in the
sense of not being logical developments structurally, is because of the patchwork that goes into
their creation, satisfying this judge, getting a majority by putting in a footnote, striking out a
sentence that would have made a paragraph lucid, and it becomes opaque. This is also one of
the reasons why judicial opinions, except dissents, are usually very poor literature.
Id. (quoting an interview with Justice Douglas).
45. Id. at 35 (quoting Justice Holmes in remarking on a set of his own opinions that "[tiheir only merit is
brevity").
46. Wanderer, supra note 37, at 59 ("Because lengthy opinions are sometimes difficult to dissect, they
should be divided into sections with section headings corresponding to each of the issues on appeal.").
47. John Fischer, Reading Literature/Reading Law: Is there a Literary Jurisprudence? 72 TEX. L. REV.
135, 148 (1993).
48. CARDOZO, supra note 39, at 112-14.
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or brings to light what had a previous existence, but had been perverted or
obscured" 49 that ignoring stare decisis is permitted. °
These technical elements are not mutually exclusive of one another; a brief
opinion that is well organized is not necessarily clear, nor is a clear and brief
opinion necessarily well organized. Any opinion that is clear, brief, well
organized, or adheres to precedent without advancing a logical and well reasoned
line of thought will never be considered "great."5' The court's rationale for an
opinion is ordinarily assumed devoid of emotion, even if the process by which a
judge arrived at the decision was not. Presumably, this is because "a number of
the strongest emotions, such as anger, disgust, indignation, and love, would be
out of place because they would interfere with the problem-solving pro-
cess ...... ,52 Consequently, a good judicial opinion will strive to meet the
aforementioned technical rules, while attempting to neutralize any language that
implies an emotional bias. In turn, "the overwhelmingly preponderant subject
matter for rhetorical analysis transpires to be a series of legally stated normative
imperatives or presumptions... it is these figures that the ... legal judgment will
utilize to maintain its legitimacy in the face of the legal audience."53 Judicial
opinions are thus judged by both their technical and substantive merit.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo believed that distinguishing an opinion's technical
merit from its substantive merit was an imprecise and counterproductive task
because the two are nearly inseparable.54 An opinion's substantive value is
minimal though, when its text is inaccessible due to poor technical traits. It is at
this point, where substance and technicalities are not significant enough to create
lines between great and good judicial opinions, that an opinion's use of rhetoric,
i.e., the way in which the opinion persuades, comes into play.
2. The Role of Empathy
Posner is skeptical of the relationship between law and literature,55 but tries to
make sense of it, in part, by locating the two genres on a spectrum of persua-
49. Horace Binney, Life of Chief Justice Tilghman, 1 AM. L. MAG. 1, 14 (1843).
50. Id. Binney equivocates this as being the moment that stare decisis is no longer compelling by stating
that this is when, "[i]f ever[,] [that a judge's] labours approach the merit of discovery ." Id.
51. See infra Part HL.C for discussion on additional factors.
52. See Posner, supra note 2, at 311.
53. GOODRICH, supra note 18, at 119.
54. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, reprinted in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER
ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 4-6 (Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1931) "'We are merely wasting our time,' so many will
inform us, 'if we bother about form when only substance is important.' I suppose this would be true if any one
could tell us where substance ends and form begins." Id. Also subscribing to Henry James' view on the matter,
"'Form is not substance to that degree that there is absolutely no substance without it. Form alone takes, and
holds, and preserves substance, saves it from the welter of helpless verbiage that we swim in as in a sea of
tasteless tepid pudding."' Id.
55. Hence, the title: LAW AND LITERATURE, A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (emphasis added).
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sion. 6 Posner places logic and emotion at opposite ends of the spectrum, thereby
inferring that judicial opinions and literature will follow to their respective ends. 7
Posner acknowledges that these ends of the spectrum are extreme, and in
between the ends of logic and emotion lay other means of persuasion, which he
calls the "domain of practical reason." 8 Posner says that this domain "includes,
among many other methods of persuasion available within the legal culture,
appeals to common sense, to custom, to precedents and other authorities, to
intuition and recognition[,] ... to history, to consequences, and to the 'test of
time.'" 9
Although differences exist in their application, Posner concedes that judicial
opinions and literature both utilize the techniques found on this spectrum to
assure readers of the integrity of the text. The fact that both genres employ
similar means of persuasion, however, also serves to illustrate the dissimilar
grounds on which each genre finds success: judicial opinions successfully
persuade the audience when the text is founded on reason (or other modes
located closer to that end of the spectrum), while literature achieves persuasion
when readers complete a novel, confident that the emotions at work are
legitimate.60
Martha Nussbaum also explores the relationship between literature and
judicial opinions: "storytelling and literary imagining are not opposed to rational
argument, but can provide essential ingredients in a rational argument., 61 She
makes the further claim that "the literary imagination.., seems to [be] an
essential ingredient of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the
good of other people whose lives are distant from our own. Such an ethical
stance will have a large place for rules and formal decision procedures ....,,6' A
literary imagination, Nussbaum explains, serves the purpose of imagining
connections between two people (or ideas, or opinions) that were previously
thought to be entirely unconnected:
Literature focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to wonder about
themselves. ... In their very mode of address to their imagined reader,
[literary works] convey the sense that there are links of possibility, at
least on a very general level, between the characters and the reader. The
reader's emotions and imagination are highly active as a result .....
56. POSNER, supra note 10, at 287.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. But see Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442, 2454 (1989) (claiming that the
creation of an empathetic relationship is what truly enables persuasion to occur).
61. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at xiii.
62. Id. at xvi.
63. Id. at 5.
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Nussbaum's assertion is resonant of one made by Henry James in The Art of
Fiction:
The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of
things, to judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling
life in general so completely that you are well on your way to knowing
any particular comer of it-this cluster of gifts may almost be said to
constitute experience, and they occur in country and in town, and in the
most differing stages of education. 64
Although James' observation is addressed to writers of fiction, the
premise is analogous to Nussbaum's argument that authors of judicial
opinions must imagine the impact of their words and foresee the implications
on future individuals." This method of solving litigants' disputes employs
means that are not near (or immediately adjacent to) the end of Posner's
spectrum that focuses on pure logic. Nussbaum supports her premise with the
same quote from Justice Breyer used at the beginning of this piece, but the
two are not alone in thinking that reading literary works, and thus indulging
emotionalism, puts judges at an advantage. In a letter to a twelve-year-old
seeking advice on how to prepare for a legal career, Justice Felix Frankfurter
gave the following reply:
The best way to prepare for the law is to come to the study of the law as
a well-read person. . . . No less important for a lawyer is the cultivation
of the imaginative faculties by reading poetry, seeing great paintings....
and listening to great music. Stock your mind with the deposit of much
good reading, and widen and deepen your feelings by experiencing
vicariously as much as possible the wonderful mysteries of the universe.
66
Thus, another commonality exists between judicial opinions and literature:
the need for an imagination that will enable a writer of either genre to envision
and foresee how one's acts will affect future individuals and relate with other
aspects of life.67 This literary imagination, as Nussbaum terms it, is necessary for
64. Henry James, The Art of Fiction, in PARTIAL PORTRAITS (1888), reprinted in WHITE, supra note 38,
at 48.
65. NUSSBAUM,supra note 1, at 81-82, 92-94, 99.
66. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to M. Paul Claussen, Jr. (May,
1954), in THE WORLD OF LAW: THE LAW AS LITERATURE 725 (Ephraim London ed., Simon and Schuster
1960).
67. See also Blomquist, supra note 40, at 671 (quoting Professor Nussbaum's assertion that "'the ability
to think of people's lives in the novelist's way is ... an important part of the equipment of a judge-not the
whole, or even the central part, but a vital part nonetheless,"' in (Martha Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial
Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1477, 1496 (1995)); Fischer, supra note 47, at 136
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literary authors and judges who wish to achieve universal appeal to a perpetual
audience.
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GENRES
The most significant similarity between great judicial opinions and great
literature, as identified thus far, is that writers in both genres must concern
themselves with an unknowable (and perhaps, non-existing) audience. This is the
element of universality that Posner identifies as enabling literature to stand the
test of time, and that Justice Breyer and Nussbaum both identify as enabling a
judge to issue far-reaching opinions. The element of universality is significant,
but there is still the question of whether great literature and great judicial
opinions command a difference significant enough to warrant distinctive tests of
greatness. In a word, yes. The difference that is most significant between the two
genres is perhaps the most obvious characteristic of each-literature and judicial
opinions are written for different reasons. Consequently, the rhetoric to which
each subscribes, i.e., the way in which the text attempts to persuade its audience
by achieving a chosen end, is different as well.
A. Different Purposes
Judicial opinions are written to induce action, a mandate to the litigating
parties to perform in a certain way.68 Specific goals from one judicial opinion to
the next may differ, but all judicial opinions are written with the intent of
persuading the audience. The audience for a judicial opinion does not typically
include the public. Generally, it includes the litigating attorneys, fellow members
of the judiciary, the parties, future litigants, and only occasionally, the public.
Judges attempt to convince these readers that their decision is the product of such
a logical and well-reasoned argument that there was simply no alternative
outcome for the disposition of the case.69 In so doing, the opinion, whether sitting
in a library gathering dust, or being read with fervor by lawyers, litigants, and the
public, creates a binding authority, regardless of who knows about it. In this way
judicial opinions act in both a dormant and active sense.7 ° They are dormant in
that they remain unknown by most people over whom they have an effect, and
become active only when a disagreement (i.e., a lawsuit) causes the pertinent law
(stating that "[literature... shapes the ethical sensibility of the aspiring lawyer and results in a responsible use
of language in legal practice").
68. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1372 (1995) (stating that "judges write opinions ... to tell others... what to do").
69. Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REv. 1545, 1557, 1571,
1589 (1990). In calling persuasion the ultimate goal of judicial opinions, it is necessary to point out that three
sub-purposes are simultaneously accomplished in achieving persuasion: "advocacy, closure, and the rule of
law." Id. at 1589.
70. See Wald, supra note 68.
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to become known by the parties involved. While the opinion has, at that point,
certainly become active for the parties involved in the lawsuit, it remains
dormant for all the uninvolved parties who have no knowledge of its existence.
But even while waiting for a dispute that will bring a given opinion into light, the
opinion is still binding, still commanding an adherence to the law it creates and
thus simultaneously dormant and active.
A novel does no such thing, nor does it purport to. A novel that goes unread
by an individual may indirectly affect that person, if he or she has an
acquaintance who is so taken with the greatness of Shakespeare that conver-
sations become filled with references to one of his plays. But a person who has
not read Hamlet for himself does not experience the intimacy of individually
reading the great work of literature. Consequently, the unread person will lack
the understanding, imagination, or empathy he may have gained from reading
Hamlet, but neither society, the law, nor justice have the means of holding such a
person accountable for his or her unawareness. This is not to suggest that
understanding, imagination, or empathy are the only purposes that writers of
literature intend to serve; rather, the purposes of literature warrant a less defined
description than the purpose(s) of judicial writing, as "literature is likely to
celebrate and explore the problematic, the uncertain, the ambiguous, the
subjective, the irrational, the insoluble .... It strives to preserve the problems
that have not been solved-problems that may require preservation precisely
because of our instinct to look away or to embrace feigned solutions."7' In
comparison, although judicial opinions undoubtedly deal with the uncertain,
ambiguous, subjective, irrational, and insoluble, they do so specifically for the
purpose of resolving disputes, not preserving them.
B. Different Rhetorics
Given the different goals of judicial opinions and literature, the distinctive
means used to achieve the differing ends become clearer:
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, telling
its story in a particular way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the
process it connects the case with earlier cases, the particular facts with
more general concerns. It translates the experience of the parties ... into
the language of the law ... and it translates the texts of the law .. . into
the terms defined by the facts of the present case.
72
The means used in conveying the "claim of meaning" to the opinion's reader
is primarily based on the use of an impersonal voice,73 which is meant to imply a
71. Wetlaufer, supra note 69, at 1564.
72. James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For? 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 1363, 1367-68 (1995).
73. Wetlaufer, supra note 69, at 1565.
2005 / Great Judicial Opinions versus Great Literature
lack of personal investment in the decision, and hence, a lack of emotion.
Predictably, literature often uses a different approach:
[Literature] will ... acknowledge and examine the multiplicity of
perspectives and the personal contingency of reality. Though it may tell
some story in a way that renders the truth, it will rarely claim to reveal
the one true meaning of things. . . . [I]t will confront the limits of
knowledge and reason, often casting the rational and logical man not as
the hero but as the fool.
74
Distinguishing between the two formats illustrates the place that rhetoric has
in both. Aristotle originally described rhetoric as "a faculty or art whose practice
will help us to observe 'in any given case the available means of persuasion.
'
'
75
Thus, "[rhetoric] was quite simply.., the study of all forms of public speech. 76
Over time, however, a different meaning has developed, and rhetoric is now
popularly understood as a necessary evil, a means of persuasion in which a party
uses extreme measures to communicate his message and hopes by doing so to
convince his audience that what he is saying is true.77 Described as "specious,
bombastic or deceitful use of language[,] rhetoric.., is the abuse of language. 78
Though not a universally accepted definition,79 this characterization inherently
separates the meaning of the words being spoken from the form in which they are
delivered.
Though both legitimate content and the means of communication are
inescapably necessary for a sound judicial opinion,8 the content of great
literature need not conform to a similar set of formulaic standards, so long as it
centers on issues that will have universal appeal to encourage its survival.8 ' Thus,
the content matter of great literature is still an issue, but because literature does
not operate within the same boundaries as judicial opinions, novelists may
concern themselves as much with stylistic matters as with the content of their
works. In contrast, the content of a judicial opinion, specifically its legal
reasoning, is the crux of the opinion's attempt at persuasion. 2 Faulty reasoning,
74. Id. at 1564.
75. FISH, supra note 8, at 478 (quoting Aristotle's definition of rhetoric).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., GOODRICH, supra note 18, at 8.
78. Id. at 85.
79. The constraints of this paper preclude delving into the history of rhetoric's development and its
disparate definitions. For discussions on the matter, see FISH, supra note 8, at 478.
80. See supra pp. 19-23.
81. See supra pp. 6-7.
82. Wanderer, supra note 37, at 49 ("Judicial scholars in the United States ... emphasize the importance
of writing a reasoned justification for the outcome in a case as a way of achieving the goals of our judicial
system.").
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regardless of an opinion's technical merit, only begs for reversal on appeal. 3
Therefore, drafters of judicial opinions must be concerned with what they say
and how they say it because failure to do so leads to breakdown in the overall
persuasion of a piece, and if an opinion has failed to persuade its audience, then it
seems unlikely that such an opinion will be characterized as "great" by any
standard.
C. The Elements at Work: Excerpts From the Cases
Authors of judicial opinions seem to walk a finer line than authors of
literature. Judicial opinions must address more topics than merely an endearing
issue that generations of people will find compelling. An opinion must balance
the technical merit that is necessary for a great judicial opinion against a broader
spectrum of interests than those presented by the parties in their briefs-the
interests of the absent parties.
Brown v. Board of Education provides an interesting case study because
although it is categorically accepted as great,s it arguably lacks technical merit. It
is true that Brown is (1) clear, with its easy declaration of the issue, 5 (2) brief, at
a mere 13 pages long, 6 and (3) undoubtedly a masterful demonstration of Chief
Justice Earl Warren's "artful use of legal rules," as he refused to apply legislative
history where it was not helpful, 7 instituted the use of social science data as
reliable evidence on which to base decisions, 8 and wrote with the clear intent of
targeting an audience larger than the parties and lawyers involved in the case.8 9
And although the Court received backlash throughout the country in the
opinion's immediate aftermath, 9° the fiftieth anniversary celebrations that marked
83. But see discussion regarding Cardozo's statement that separating form and substance is a
counterproductive task, supra p. 21.
84. See generally DVD: Judicial Wall Dedication (University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
2003) (on file with the McGeorge School of Law Dean's Office). At this filmed event, Justice Richard
Goldstone of the Constitutional Court of South Africa spoke regarding the effect that Brown v. Board of
Education has had on the international legal community. He remarked that Brown has been cited by courts in
his own country, Canada, and India as a landmark decision worthy of precedential value outside of the United
States.
85. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The issue of the case is stated as follows: "We come then to the question
presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that it does."
86. Id. at 483-496.
87. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 697 (1975) (quoting Barret Prettyman, Justice Robert Jackson's
law clerk at the time as saying "'[tihe genius of the Warren opinion.., was that it... didn't pretend that the
Fourteenth Amendment was more helpful than history suggested').
88. Id. at 703-06.
89. See Gibson, supra note 39, at 922 (stating that the majority of an opinion's audience largely consists
of professionals, but that "occasionally the judge writes with an awareness that his words may be displayed to
the general public").
90. See Michael J. Fellows, Civil Rights-Shades of Race: An Historically Informed Reading of Title
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the decision's longevity demonstrate that it has come to be accepted as an
unequivocally accurate decision. 9'
The remainder of Chief Justice Warren's opinion, however, does not
incorporate the other technical elements of organization and adherence to
precedent. The opinion is obviously organized, though not in the traditional
fashion where the issue is followed by the procedural history, then the facts, the
legal rules and doctrine, and finally, the court's decision. Instead, it begins by
foreshadowing the issue by stating "a common legal question justifies [the]
consideration [of these various cases] together in this consolidated opinion."92
This statement is followed with a short factual description, an equally short
procedural history, and then a synopsis of the "separate but equal" doctrine. 9 The
Court does not address the issue of the case until after (1) the plaintiffs'
arguments have been described and (2) an explanation of why history is not
helpful in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court then discusses
evidence regarding the plaintiffs' claims, distinguishes prior cases addressing the
issue of separate but equal in schools, and finally presents the reasons for the
inevitable holding.94 The Court addresses administrative concerns in facilitating
the order, and the opinion quickly ends.
Despite his divergence from sound technical practices, Chief Justice Warren
managed to combine the sound logic and reason that any judicial opinion is
supposed to base its finding on with an appeal to empathy, thus convincing the
opinion's audience (which did include the public) that desegregation was the
only available decision for the Court. Chief Justice Warren composed the opinion
in such a way as to force the reader into understanding-and empathizing with-
the unfortunate psychological and social effects that would have inevitably
plagued segregated children if Plessy v. Ferguson remained good law.95 Because
VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387 n. 83 (2004) (inferring that a "violent repression of black southerners"
occurred post Brown) and Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 453 (2005)
(stating that two years after Brown was issued, Justice William Douglas appeared before the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to address massive resistance to school desegregation).
91. See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 279, 280 (2005) (characterizing Brown as having "succeeded in launching a desegregation movement")
(emphasis added) and Earl M. Maltz, Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75 (2004) ("The year
2004 witnessed a vast outpouring of scholarship analyzing the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education .... The magnitude of this literature reflects the impact of Brown not
only on the development of constitutional jurisprudence, but also on the overall pattern of race relations in
America."). Though these scholars credit the Brown court for its landmark decision, contemporary authors also
question whether the promise of Brown has been fulfilled. See e.g., Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical
Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 974 (2005) (book review) (calling it "somewhat
ironic.., that on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown many scholars and some civil rights activists regard the
decision as a failure" due to its failed implementation).
92. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 494 (reasoning that "[separation] . . . solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone" and "[sleparate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
95. Id. ("To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
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Chief Justice Warren presented Plessy as an impossible rule of law to uphold, the
Court was forced to diverge from the tradition of stare decisis. However, the
Court's divergence from precedent does not necessarily mark the opinion as
failing the technical elements. According to Justice Cardozo's theory, precedent
is only useful for uniformity purposes so long as it is "balanced against the social
interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare. 96 Thus,
while sound judicial opinions may rest on precedent, equally sound judicial
opinions may not adhere to stare decisis if circumstances warrant departure.
Chief Justice Warren managed to present these circumstances as such, thus
allowing the Court to depart from the holding in Plessy.
If the Brown decision is not great for its use of solid technical features, then
is it because of the mountainous issue it resolved? Is it because of the decision's
timeliness, sandwiched between the tail end of World War Two, an era
dominated by the notion that oppression of human rights was fundamentally
wrong, and the beginning of the Civil Rights movement that marked the United
States during the mid-twentieth century? 97 Or is it because of the combination of
both the issue resolved and the timeliness in which it was decided? If Brown v.
Board of Education is great for any one of these single reasons, it is also great for
its implementation of empathy. Chief Justice Warren unabashedly acknowledged
that the decision was being issued not merely for the parties before the Court, but
instead to all students who were certain to experience the negative effects that
segregation would have if no change were ordered.
We must look.., to the effect of segregation itself on public education ....
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the nation. Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.9"
Chief Justice Warren's approach epitomizes what Justice Breyer and
Nussbaum advocate: listen to an individual's story, learn as much as one can
about the issue without being able to walk in that individual's shoes for a day,99
and then attempt to issue an opinion that resolves the instant dispute on both an
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.").
96. CARDOZO, supra note 39, at 112-14.
97. See generally DVD: Judicial Wall Dedication, supra note 84. At this filmed event, Justice Richard
Goldstone of the Constitutional Court of South Africa spoke regarding the affect that Brown v. Board of
Education has had on the international legal community.
98. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
99. See id. at 495 n. 11. Chief Justice Warren relied on psychological studies to support the conclusion
that .'[slegregation of white and colored children in public school has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children .... Segregation with the sanction of the law, therefore, has the tendency to (retard) the educational
and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial(ly) integrated school system."' Id. Although Chief Justice Warren's reliance on the psychological studies
has been criticized, it still illustrates the point on hand: that Chief Justice Warren was concerned with
understanding these plaintiffs' perspectives, and that he was determined to understand it to the best of his
ability.
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immediate and grand scale. Brown illustrates the complex array of factors that
are present in judicial opinions by balancing the technical elements of an opinion,
including its substantive legal reasoning, against a need for emotionalism in order
to demonstrate the gravity of the issue decided. Chief Justice Warren carefully
chose which technical merits to implement, and combined these choices with the
rhetorical device of empathy, a combination that persuaded his audience that the
doctrine of separate but equal "has no place" in the field of public education. '°°
The fact that law students continue to read Plessy v. Ferguson in conjunction
with Brown'0' undercuts the idea of using survivability as the operational test for
great judicial opinions. Plessy is no longer viable law,'02 but is still perpetually taught
in modem law school curricula, and as such is placed directly before Brown in all of
the leading constitutional law casebooks.' 3 This juxtaposition is interesting because
Plessy is often cited as a terrible opinion,'° while Brown is cited as one of the greatest
substantive opinions ever written by the Court.°5
The difference between the two opinions does not lie in distinctive technical
qualities. Indeed, Plessy's technical merit is perhaps as meritorious as Brown's. Like
Brown, it is clear, with its easy declaration of the issue, '6 and brief, at a mere fifteen
pages long.'07 The opinion also attempts an "artful use of legal rules" by avoiding an
in-depth analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment in calling it simply "too clear for
argument."'0 s Similarly dismissive, the Plessy Court said the Fourteenth Amendment,
though intended to "enforce the absolute equality of the races before the law," was
simply not intended to "abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
100. Id. at 495.
101. See e.g., NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 656 (4th ed. 2002); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 624 (6th ed. 2000); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
& GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 637 (14th ed. 2001).
102. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
103. REDLICH, supra note 101 (placing Plessy at pages 656-58 with Brown directly following at 658-
662); ROTUNDA, supra note 101 (placing Plessy at 624-626 with Brown directly following at 626-629);
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 101 (placing Plessy at 637-639 with Brown directly following at 639-643).
One leading casebook, JESSE H. CHOPEL ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES: CASES-
COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1086, 1162, 1167 (9th ed. 2001) places Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) in between Plessy and Brown, but the point remains that Plessy continues to be taught, despite being
overturned.
104. Compare Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1281 n.70 (2003) (criticizing
Plessy for "legitimiz[ing] the worst form of race discrimination) with Kent Greenawalt, Interpretation and
Judgment, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 415, 430 (1997) (calling Brown a great constitutional decision).
105. See e.g., DVD: Judicial Wall Dedication, supra note 84. See also KLUGER, supra note 87, at 697
(1975). "'The genius of the Warren opinion ... was that it was so simple and unobtrusive .... His opinion took
the sting off the decision, it wasn't accusatory, and it didn't pretend that the Fourteenth Amendment was more
helpful than history suggested ...."' Id. (quoting Barret Prettyman, Justice Robert Jackson's law clerk).
106. 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896) (stating that the issue is whether the constitutionality of race-based
segregation in railroad cars "conflicts both with the thirteenth amendment of the constitution, abolishing
slavery, and the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part of the states").
107. See 163 U.S. at 537-52.
108. Id. at 542.
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distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. ' °9 Indeed, the difference between Plessy and Brown lies in
the Plessy Court's unwillingness to engage in empathy for the plaintiffs. The opinion
does not indicate that the Court ever considered the harm such a rule would have on
the plaintiffs or their successors. Instead, it focuses on the ability of the states to draft
legislation permitting segregation in public places, relying on the establishment of
segregated schools in "states where the political rights of the colored race have been
longest and most earnestly enforced." 1
0
Today, Plessy is taught not for its lesson of how to write (or not write) a judicial
opinion, but to provide students with a contextual understanding of Brown's
significance. Reading Brown by itself still would be a useful exercise in reading an
artful opinion; it still would be a useful exercise in learning the law of equal
protection; perhaps it would even be a useful exercise in appreciating the political
climate of the United States in the early 1950s. What it would not be, however, is
useful in understanding the progression of segregation and the change of view that
the Court experienced in a short time frame-a mere sixty years."'
For purposes of this comment, however, the bottom line is that the term
"survivability" lacks meaning when a "great" judicial opinion that uses empathy as a
rhetorical device is taught alongside a "terrible" opinion that demonstrates some
technical merit, but misses the boat in understanding what the long-term implications
of its holding would be. Survivability cannot stand as the operational test for great
judicial opinions when both great and horrible opinions maintain a simultaneous
presence in modem times.
IV. CONCLUSION
Great literature and great judicial opinions share the need to address a perpetual
audience, which requires authors in both genres to envision how their words will
affect an unknowable group of readers. Consequently, authors in both genres must
render their particular narratives in ways most likely to create empathy for an
unknowable audience. Per Posner's test, authors of literature will realize the
consequence of their unwillingness to do so when their works fail to survive. Authors
of judicial opinions, however, need not concern themselves with such a fate when
truly bad decisions, whether bad in substance, form, or both, continue to be taught
and utilized alongside the truly great opinions that do demonstrate an effort at
empathy. It is for this reason that Posner's test of time for great literature is not
helpful when evaluating whether a judicial opinion is "great."
109. Id. at 544.
110. Id.
111. Plessy was decided in 1896, Brown in 1954.

